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In March 1996 a meeting of Georgian and Abkhaz intellectuals was organized in 
Moscow. In the ensuing common declaration several ideas were put forward, with which 
I would fully agree:  
 
"It is of no use to accuse one another, trying to find out who actually started the 
violence (...) Dialogue should be sought instead." 
 
"Prior to discussing the issue of the future legal status of Abkhazia, it is necessary 
to develop a system of social and political guarantees that can secure peace in Abkhazia 
and a just settlement of the conflict." 
 
"It is necessary to secure the return of all refugees to Abkhazia." 
 
Unfortunately, mutual accusations and the abuse of tendentiously selected historic 
factography to prove a particular viewpoint still remain typical of the Abkhazian-
Georgian dialogue. The reader of this volume may judge if its contributors have 
succeeded in escaping this form of unproductive polemics. 
 
 
 
I. The Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict from a Comparative Regional Perspective 
 
 
The post-cold war world, with its numerous conflicts emerging against the background of 
competing globalization and de-globalization trends, is confronted with the problem of 
how to reduce intra-regional confrontation and promote a co-operative model. It is 
therefore necessary to develop precise definitions, criteria and indicators for determining 
the nature, role and influence of the main factors contributing both to conflicts and to 
effective co-operation. 
 
Widespread inter-ethnic confrontation and conflict are relatively new phenomena in the 
former Soviet Union. Governments are experiencing difficulty in maintaining the forms 
of co-existence that were customary in the Soviet past and in designing strategies to 
facilitate co-existence and co-operation. There is no guarantee that the political support 
and commitment needed to formulate and follow a sustainable strategy will be 
forthcoming. In a situation in which the national and international institutions that should 
take responsibility for co-ordinating the regional co-operation process are not working 
properly, or are even absent, it is essential to build partnerships, devise flexible strategies 
and build a consensus around co-operation priorities. 
 
Since the end of the 1980s, ethno-territorial conflicts have become the most noticeable 
aspect of the new political reality in the Caucasus, ruining stability, development 
prospects and even elementary economic self-sufficiency. There are five zones where 
wars and mass violence have erupted in the region during this period: Karabakh, 
Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Abkhazia, Ossetia-Ingushetia and Chechnya. 
 
The high concentration of conflicts in the Caucasus is often ascribed to the Russian secret 
service, to military or political forces fomenting antagonism, or to the particular cultures 
of the peoples inhabiting this region, supposedly characterized by intolerance and 
aggressiveness. All three explanations are unsatisfactory. The inability of ethnic groups 
to coexist should be seen as the result of failed institutional regulations rather than inborn 
qualities or geopolitical factors. This does not mean that an analysis of the roots of 
conflict in the Caucasus should overlook the role of external manipulation (the "hidden 
hand" factor) or its relation to (specific) internal “spontaneous” players in the region. It is 
not easy to determine to what extent an analysis of the conflicts may show them to be due 
to primarily intrinsic, spontaneous causes or, on the contrary, the result of deliberate 
external decisions, in particular in a situation where there is no empirical data on the 
genesis of the conflicts. It is also of the utmost importance to identify the real interests of 
the opposing population groups, interests which differ both from the declared goals and 
from the particular interests of the political élites. Nor should the specific nature of the 
Caucasian context be either underestimated or overestimated, in particular Caucasian 
cultural traditions and the geostrategic importance of the region. Some aspects of the 
Caucasian context, which are worth considering separately, are presented below: 
 
1. Territorial factor, boundaries and geography 
 
All conflicts, as they involve an attempt to change the political status of a particular 
territory, are essentially territorial in nature. All Caucasian conflicts are - in more up-to-
date terminology - sovereignty conflicts. The sacred value ascribed to territory and 
homeland can be observed world-wide, but has particular consequences in the Caucasus, 
with its extremely diversified population, its vague notion of ethnic rights on a particular 
territory, and the persistence of the Soviet legacy (including the legacy of arbitrarily 
drawn borders, of forced migrations and of the myth of the titular nation). In such 
circumstances, conflicts on boundaries and territories tend to be rather explosive. 
 
The availability of an external border and access to other states or areas populated by 
ethnically proximate people, or having an outlet to the sea, is of the utmost importance to 
the Caucasian peoples. It was no coincidence that one of the most sensitive aspects of the 
Karabakh problem was the absence of any such external border (hence the claim on the 
Lachin corridor). Likewise, it was significant that the Confederation of the Caucasian 
Peoples[i] chose Sukhumi as its capital, due to its seaside location. Russia too perceives 
an outlet to the sea as a very sensitive issue, especially since the dramatic shrinking of its 
Black Sea coastline. In so far as all the conflicts in the Caucasus are, in one way or 
another, linked to the traumatic loss of imperial power by Russia, this Russian perception 
has great importance for the region as a whole. 
 
2. Russia and the question of external manipulation 
 
Many analysts, especially those from the region itself, tend to ascribe all problems and 
deficiencies in the policies of Caucasian governments and movements to the “Russian 
factor”. A critique of this position does not mean that this factor should be 
underestimated. Russia is indeed actively involved in all the conflicts here, not only 
through its peace-keepers or paratroopers, but also through the arms trade (it sells 
weaponry to all sides in a conflict, though it is selective as to quality and quantity), 
through manipulative activities involving economic levers, or through the activities of its 
military and intelligence services. As Olivier Roy writes: "In the early 1990s Moscow 
had actively encouraged conflicts in the Caucasus while presenting itself as an honest 
broker between the combatants."[ii] As a rule, Russian policies are inconsistent and 
contradictory, but they possess incomparably greater resources than any of the local 
forces. All conflicts in the Caucasus are connected with the presence of Russian troops, 
whether these are actively participating (Chechnya, Abkhazia), performing the role of 
peace-keepers (Ossetia, Abkhazia), or acting as trainers and advisors (Karabakh). Greater 
sympathy among the Russian military and political establishments for one of the fighting 
sides is apparent in each of these conflicts (the retreat from Chechnya and the absence of 
peace-keepers in Karabakh constitute exceptions in this respect). 
 
The North Caucasians well remember the 1991 visit by the Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin to the region, when he promised the Ingush assistance in returning of the 
Prigorodny district, and when, in a second speech, he promised the Ossetians to defend 
them against Ingush ambitions. Not only did the very creation of the Ingush republic 
(without even delimiting its borders) contravene the Russian Constitution, but it was 
seemingly designed specifically by one of the interest groups in power to be a source of 
permanent tension, although hardly beneficial to Russian national interests. Such a 
prevalence of short-term group or individual interests over long-term strategic interests, 
although not unfamiliar elsewhere, dominates the political scene in the post-Soviet world. 
In the case of Russia, this contradiction is even more complicated by post-imperial 
nostalgia. Another specific illustration of Russian inconsistencies and contradictory 
policies was the arrest, in the early stages of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, of the leader 
of the Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus, Musa Shanibov, a 
former professor of Scientific Communism - allegedly for organizing military and 
terrorist activities on Georgian territory. The attempt to repress the Confederation turned 
this little-known local politician into a popular regional figure; there were certain signs 
(such as the clumsy way in which he was arrested and then released) that these 
consequences were calculated in advance, even if counter-productive to other policies. 
 
 On the one hand, the Chechen war demonstrated the possibility of successful opposition 
to the Russian state machinery, and hence served as an example to radical separatists; on 
the other, however, it demonstrated the readiness of the Russian State to deploy immense 
resources to suppress such separatist movements by force. In the consciousness of the 
Caucasian people, Chechnya pointed to the real anti-Caucasian aggressors, and shifted 
previously anti-Georgian sentiments northwards. At the same time, many Georgian 
politicians hoped that the Chechen war would lead to a change in the Russian attitude 
towards the Abkhazian problem. But Russia's unwillingness or inability to resolve the 
Abkhaz conflict betrayed these hopes. 
 
The Russian policy towards one or other of the ethnic groups is also a very important 
factor. With the exception of the Chechens, who were themselves involved in a war with 
Russia, all the parties involved in the Caucasian conflicts tried to solicit Russia's support, 
usually appealing to that country as an arbiter. Such an appeal aimed to enforce their own 
position in the conflict or in its settlement. Political support to Russia or to the Russian 
government, in the form of electoral support (for instance in North Ossetia and 
Ingushetia) or in the form of military bases (for instance from the Georgian side in the 
Abkhazian conflict), are offered in exchange for a favourable attitude from the arbiter. 
Such political calculations by the local élites reflect their lack of confidence in their own 
power. By appealing to an external arbiter they are showing their lack of any sense of 
responsibility for the conflicts in which they are involved. Their appeal for Russian 
support also shows that they overestimate Russia's potential to solve the conflicts in the 
Caucasus. Russia is still perceived as an external arbiter, a father-figure, whose force is 
decisive in the final outcome of this game. Although it could initially have played a 
decisive role in these conflicts, it now seems, however, to be not only unwilling but also 
unable to resolve them. 
 
3. Demographic balance 
 
All the conflicts are characterized by radical demographic changes in the period before 
the eruption of the conflict (peaceful migration, forced deportations under Stalin) and 
during the conflict itself (refugees, ethnic cleansing). These demographic changes lead to 
perceptions of a threat and an acute sense of insecurity. An ethnic group - or its élites - 
may fear that a weakening of its demographic position could, in the long run, radically 
alter the balance of power and the redistribution of available resources to its 
disadvantage. Such perceptions, even if they are not confirmed by the use of force by the 
party whose increasing demographic potential is feared, may lead to “preventive action” 
and hence to violent conflict. 
 
Demography is an important, sometimes even a decisive, issue in the effort by the 
traditional political élites to preserve their privileged position by increasing the "weight" 
of their respective ethnic group. The case of the Western Caucasian peoples - who 
experienced severe demographic losses after the end of the great Caucasian War in 1864, 
when Muslims from the Caucasus were either expelled by force or voluntarily emigrated 
to Turkey - is notable in this respect. The Abkhazian leadership, for instance, is 
attempting to attract members of their own diaspora in Turkey and the Middle East to 
return and repopulate the country. 
4. Patterns in argumentation on territorial claims and popular myths 
 
The Soviet heritage - including the loose definition of the borders between federal units, 
the arbitrary attribution of territorial and political status to the so-called titular [sic] 
nations and the Stalinist ideological tradition on the nationality question (definition of 
"nationality", hierarchical distinction between "people" and "ethnos", etc.) - is present in 
all the conflicts. Symbolic acts and statements as well as all sorts of national myths are 
inflated in the first stage of the conflicts, while the present stage is characterized by the 
gradually diminishing significance of these symbolic acts, statements and myths. All 
parties in the conflict had and have a pragmatic - some may even say cynical - approach 
to universal democratic norms and international law, appealing to those norms and 
provisions that they find useful for themselves and ignoring others. Double standards are 
commonplace. As Tim Potier stated recently: "The government and people of Georgia 
should not be blamed for 'claiming' what international law says is rightfully If the Abkhaz 
were in their position, they would be doing exactly the same."[iii] 
 
The demand for exclusive rights to a specific territory by one ethnic group or another is 
often linked to the demand for “autochthonous” status, while only “guest” status is 
attributed to other groups. Such claims are generally based on an arbitrary use of 
historical facts. Some Georgian scholars have argued, for instance, that the Abkhazians 
came to Abkhazia from the North Caucasian mountains only recently. This, it is argued, 
is proved by the lack of an Abkhazian word for “sea”. The Abkhazian scientists in turn 
have selected other arguments from the scant historical information available to argue 
that, on the contrary, it is the Georgians who should be regarded as newcomers to a 
region that was part of the Abkhazian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. In the same vein, 
Armenians claim historical rights to Karabakh, although most sources show that the 
Caucasian Albanians inhabited the region. Azeri sources claim that most of the 
Armenians in this region are descendants of the Armenian migrants from Iran and Turkey 
who came to Karabakh during the 19th century, after the Russian military victories. The 
Azeris claim to be the descendants and heirs of the Christian Albanian population, and 
thus the real autochthonous inhabitants of Karabakh. 
 
Some political claims are easier to substantiate with historical facts than others. Thus it is 
easily proved that there were next to no Ossetians among the population of Tskhinvali 
until the 1920s, or that the Ingush actually did inhabit the right bank of the Terek river 
before their forced deportation to Central Asia at the end of the second world war, when 
the territory was offered to the Ossetians (supposedly more loyal to the Soviet regime). In 
cases like these, the opposing party may indeed find it difficult to substantiate its political 
claims using historical material. The legitimacy of the whole argument based on the 
difference between autochthonous and immigrant peoples may also be rejected by such a 
party, which then tries to legitimize its political claims by a relatively more recent 
historic past, for example, along the following lines: "Those who are currently occupying 
a territory should have all the rights to it" - as in the case of the Magyars who settled in 
Hungary some centuries ago, or the Turks, who have occupied Constantinople since the 
15th century. In both types of legitimization, history is manipulated for political reasons. 
The impact of such historical arguments on the public consciousness of all the ethnic 
groups living in the Caucasus is a strong a strong factor in the generation of conflicts. 
 
A vaguely defined right to self-determination is the main argument in all the disputes 
mentioned above, with the sole exception of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict. In the case of 
Abkhazia, this right conflicts with the democratic principle of majority rule, but in South 
Ossetia, where the Ossetians constitute a majority, it does not. This is yet another 
demonstration of the instrumental use of historical, demographic and legal arguments in 
various conflicts. 
 
5. Different levels of ethnic identity and religion 
 
Different levels may be distinguished in the ethnic self-identification of the Caucasian 
peoples. The Ingush and the Chechens consider that they have very distinct identities, but 
at the same time they stress their ethnic affinity (their languages belong to the Vainakh, 
or Nakh, group). They also regard themselves as Caucasians, and are ready in some cases 
to prove this latter identity by political or even military action. Likewise, the Abkhazians 
and the Circassians set great store by their ethnic proximity, as well as their Caucasian 
identity. The barbaric neologism currently popular in Russia, "a person of Caucasian 
nationality" - which reflects the general repressive, anti-Caucasian mood in that country - 
effectively strengthens this common identity. 
 
Peoples who speak Turkic and Indo-European languages also have to define their place 
within the framework of this common Caucasian identity. Not only peoples like the 
above-mentioned Circassians, but also Balkars, Ossetians and Kumyks should be taken 
into account. These, however, are far less active in the pan-Caucasian integration 
processes (e.g. in the Confederation of Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus). 
  
Another feature peculiar to the conflicts mentioned above is that they all take place 
between groups belonging to markedly different linguistic families (Slavic 
Russians/Kartvelian Georgians/Iranian Ossetians/Turkic Azeris/Vainakh Ingush and 
Chechens, Abkhazians of the Adygho-Abkhaz group, and Armenians). Linguistically 
related ethnic groups support each other, as in the case of the Ingush and Chechens, or the 
Abkhaz and Adyghs. This is one of the reasons why ethnogenetic theories and myths play 
a much greater role in the Caucasus, while the religious factor is secondary, contrary to 
places like the former Yugoslavia where the ethnic conflicts take place between groups 
that are closely related linguistically but are denominationally distinct. 
The role of the religious factor in the Caucasian conflicts is commonly overestimated. 
Although in some cases (e.g. Chechnya, with its strong Islamic networks) religion may 
play a significant role, local political élites generally display a rather pragmatic 
manipulative attitude towards it. After his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze lost no time in 
getting baptized - by the more Orthodox name of Giorgi. The Abkhaz president Ardzinba 
promised to build a mosque in order to placate the religious feelings of his more devoted 
Muslim Abkhazian compatriots in Turkey. The population, meanwhile, has to a great 
extent lost its initial interest in religious ceremonies, revived after perestroika. Religious 
symbols may, however, become more powerful during a prolonged military action 
against opponents of a different religious creed. This happened in Chechnya, where there 
is a still significant Sufi tradition and where the historical memory of the 19th century 
jihad against the Russians is still very much alive. Now many Chechens support the 
introduction of shariat principles into penitentiary practice, though they may often be 
unable to demonstrate a basic knowledge of its fundamental principles. 
 
6. Economic factors 
 
The economic interests of Russian and Caucasian states and the volume of resources that 
they are ready to deploy in order to achieve particular political goals need to be assessed 
in detail. Among these are the economic interests and resources of various élites and 
groups - such as the arms and drug dealers, oil companies and multinationals - that have 
to be taken into account, together with the economic significance of decisions taken by 
the state administration. All these factors imply significant capital flows. The war in 
Chechnya has enriched some of the military, while the resources allocated to the 
rehabilitation of the economy have fed those economic players who were able to control 
this decision politically. Pipeline policies and the future redistribution of the oil-generated 
profits is a dominant factor in the Russian policies in Karabakh and Chechnya, and may 
play an increasingly important role in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict. Russia seems to 
be persisting in its manipulation of ethno-territorial conflicts in order to secure its 
strategic economic (oil) interests. 
 
7. The time perspective, concepts of the future and the basic interests of the population 
 
None of the opposing sides has any feasible, realistic proposal, which may be considered 
a sound basis for conflict settlement, to offer the other side. Russia has no compromise to 
offer either, and until recently seemed not to be interested in sustainable settlements.  In 
most cases a conflict is seen as a zero-sum game, in which the perception of both the 
possible negative consequences of certain factors or events for the interests of each party 
(in particular as regards the demographic balance between different populations on the 
disputed territory, or the overall balance of power), as well as possible positive 
consequences for the interests of the opposing party in the conflict, are largely 
exaggerated. 
 
 A population’s safety, prosperity and participation in governance could be described as 
its basic needs. This is quite a simple definition. It is, however, not easy to discuss the 
means of securing such basic needs. So in the case of Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, 
for instance, it is evident that there is no rapid solution leading to their return - to northern 
Abkhazia in particular - that would give them sufficient security guarantees and at the 
same time ensure democratic governance in Abkhazia. Only a more complex, stage by 
stage process can lead to a compromise acceptable to both sides. As in many other cases 
of conflict between "formal" democracy and "ethnic" demography, the only possible 
solution - albeit a slow one - involves a basic democratization process accompanied by 
very cautious demographic policies, linked to complete procedural transparency and an 
ongoing process of negotiation. 
 
II - New trend in Georgia's political orientation 
 
 
The failure of the assassination attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995 led to new 
geopolitical initiatives and trends in the Caucasus. Igor Giorgadze, the Georgian State 
Security Minister and son of the leader of the Communist party - the main rival of 
Shevardnadze's Union of Citizens - escaped to Moscow on a Russian military plane, after 
having been accused of masterminding the assassination attempt. Shevardnadze exploited 
to the full this opportunity to get rid of the strongmen dominating the political scene. He 
scored a clear-cut political victory over all his rivals. But even more important was the 
reorientation of the country towards the West rather than towards Russia. 
 
Despite the Russian military bases in Georgia, the presence of Russian border guards at 
the Georgian border with Turkey and Russian peace-keepers in the two zones of conflict 
(Tskhinvali and Abkhazia), this reorientation of foreign policy became evident at the end 
of 1996. It was encouraged by Russian failures in Chechnya and the change in Western 
attitudes to the region. The latter were caused not only by the immensely important factor 
of Caspian oil, but also by the general shift in Western priorities after the partial 
resolution of the Bosnian crisis and the general disappointment in Russia's 
democratization process, revealed most explicitly by the acceleration of the NATO 
enlargement to the East. 
 
The doubling of Western investments in the Georgian economy during the last two 
months of 1996 reflected the emergence of a new situation. The rising power of the West 
in the region - at least in the minds of the Georgian people - contrasts with the waning 
power of Russia. Russia is tempted to use the CIS in order to re-establish its control over 
former Soviet republics, but it avoids too strong an integration, fearing an influx of non-
Slavic people into Russia - fears heightened by the lower birth rate among the Slavic 
population than among Muslim minorities. Nevertheless, it is confronted by 
catastrophically diminishing resources and organizational abilities. Georgian public 
opinion perceives Russian policies - in particular the policy of “divide and rule” - as 
being a serious threat to the country's security. The potential economic or strategic 
benefit of any Georgian-Russian co-operation is seen as far less important than this type 
of threat. 
 
Although the visit by the NATO Secretary-General, Solana, to the southern states of the 
CIS sparked a harsh reaction from some Moscow politicians, it may to an extent be 
considered merely symbolic - in line with the still prevailing tendency to substitute 
demonstrative actions for real policies towards the NIS. It may also be seen as an 
expression of the change in balance of the forces involved in the region. In his speech 
delivered on 11 February 1997, in Tbilisi, Mr Solana stressed the new role of Georgia 
and the Caucasus: 
 
"My visit today should be understood as a sign of the value that we at NATO attach to 
our relationship with Georgia. We want to continue and deepen that relationship. Indeed, 
the opportunities for co-operation with NATO are almost endless. On NATO’s side, we 
would enthusiastically welcome the growing involvement of Georgia across the whole 
range of our co-operation programmes. Georgia's geographical position may be far from 
Brussels, but its concerns and interests are far from remote. The Caucasus is an important 
region for Europe, and there is great social and economic potential to be realized, once 
underlying security issues have been resolved peacefully and in accordance with OSCE 
values and commitments. Europe cannot be fully secure, or realize its own full potential, 
if the Caucasus countries are left out of the European security equation."[iv] 
 
The emergence of close co-operation between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, believed to be 
brokered by Shevardnadze, indicates that forms of integration of CIS countries that are 
not Moscow-centred have some chance of success. This alliance, with implicit Turkish 
participation, is a distinct alternative to the traditional CIS process of regionalism which 
failed to go beyond declamatory policies or to substantiate Russia's aspiration to be a 
superpower. The issues at stake in Azeri-Georgian-Ukrainian co-operation are obvious: a 
way of counterbalancing Russia's dominance, in particular in relation to the energy and 
economic security of the participating states. 
 
An activation of Turkish-Georgian relations followed this process. On 28 February 1997, 
a delegation of Turkish Mejlis visited Georgia. The head of the delegation, Mr. Hatin-
oglu, stressed Turkey's interest in facilitating the peaceful settlement of the Abkhazian 
problem, categorically supporting Georgia's territorial integrity and emphasising Turkey's 
desire to oppose the Russian scenario there. President Shevardnadze expressed his 
agreement with the Turkish viewpoint: "I think it is time for more active Turkish 
participation in the settlement of the Abkhaz conflict and other conflicts in the Caucasian 
region". He also stressed the importance of the new railway linking Turkey with 
Georgia.[v] 
 
On 15 March, Georgian Defence Minister Nadibaidze was sent by Shevardnadze on a 
personal assignment to the Ingush capital Nazran. This was one of the steps in 
implementing the "Peaceful Caucasus Initiative", promoted by Shevardnadze since the 
1996 meeting with Yeltsin and other Caucasian leaders in Kislovodsk. In Nazran, 
Nadibaidze met the Ingush President Aushev and the Chechen leader Maskhadov. 
Nadibaidze reported that both North-Caucasian leaders had supported the Peaceful 
Caucasus Initiative and had expressed their readiness for more active co-operation. They 
had both allegedly agreed that Abkhazia should remain part of Georgia, and 
acknowledged that the Chechen participation in the Georgian-Abkhaz war had been a 
mistake, Dudaev's mistake. Aushev and Maskhadov called the deployment of Russian 
border troops on the border between Georgia and the North Caucasus superfluous, while 
Nadibaidze stated that Georgia was opposed to the deployment of Russian troops on the 
Georgian side of their common border.[vi] 
 
The next important event with strong internal implications for Georgian foreign policy 
was the meeting of the CIS leaders in Moscow, on 28 March. Georgia was seeking 
progress with the deadlocked Abkhazian problem, and hoped to achieve several goals, 
among them the redeployment of Russian peace-keepers in an extended security zone in 
the Gali region, which would facilitate the return of some 100,000 Georgian refugees to 
this district. Such a return would significantly relieve the domestic political and economic 
strain of the refugee question. In Moscow, the Georgian side received symbolic support 
for its perception of the conflict, which was expressed in the Resolution of the Council of 
Heads of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Moscow, 28 March 1997) on the 
Development of the Conflict Resolution Process in Abkhazia, Georgia: 
 
"The Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States, recalling the Declaration of 
the Lisbon summit of the Heads of the OSCE member states (December 1996) that 
condemns ‘ethnic cleansing, resulting in the mass extermination and forcible expulsion of 
the predominantly Georgian population of Abkhazia’, as well as ‘actions hindering the 
return of refugees and displaced persons’, condemned in its turn ‘the position of the 
Abkhazian side, hindering the reaching of agreements on the political settlement of the 
conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, and the return, in safety and dignity, of refugees and 
displaced persons to the places of their permanent residence...’"[vii] 
 
In a sense, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has been one of the most powerful of the 
factors that mobilized opposition among Georgians to dependence on Russia. Especially 
in the long term, it has had a decisive influence on the determination of foreign policy 
priorities. Russia seems to have lost substantial political resources through this conflict 
by reinforcing an anti-Russian attitude in public opinion and among the political 
establishment in Georgia. At the same time, Georgia’s pro-Western orientation may lead 
to exaggerated expectations of Western support - the West may very well sacrifice the 
interests of small nations for the sake of stability in the Eurasian heartland. The Georgian 
government was particularly concerned about the possibility that Russia's consent to the 
eastward expansion of NATO would be obtained in exchange for American agreement to 
Russian influence in the Caucasus. 
 
The Abkhazians, who were used for a long time as Russia's strongest lever of influence 
on Georgia, also seem more and more reluctant to be used in this way by Moscow. The 
Abkhazian and Georgian sides are already trying to start negotiating with each other 
without mediators. It is astonishing to observe how, already, the first meetings between 
the leaders of the two sides have been able to change the post-war stereotypes and enemy 
images among their respective populations, who have suddenly discovered that reality 
has other colours besides just black and white. Georgians were surprised to hear rational - 
if unacceptable - arguments from Ardzinba and other Abkhaz representatives, after 
several years of an exclusively negative perception of the Abkhaz leadership. 
 
 
 
III - Conflict in Abkhazia: Specific dimensions 
 
 
 
The Abkazian population has suffered great losses in the last two centuries as a result of 
deportation and the artificial in-migration of other ethnic groups to its homeland. At the 
same time, the Soviet legacy included ingenious arrangements for maintaining the 
disproportionately large share of leadership offices held by the Abkhaz community. This 
legacy contributed to the conflagration and determined the form it would take. Specific 
factors which had a decisive influence on the outbreak of the war include the North 
Caucasian diaspora in the Near East, different evaluations of the legal aspects of the 
conflict (such as the right to self-determination versus the territorial integrity principle), 
the perception by both parties to the conflict of the righteousness of their actions, the role 
of regional and international organizations, the role of Cossacks in the conflict and the 
importance of the Russian language in Abkhazia. 
 
1. Post-conflict attitudes and lack of information 
 
The general atmosphere in Abkhazia still bears a number of immediate post-war 
characteristics. The population expects war to break out anew sooner or later, and 
consequently much discussion and public discourse concerns the prospect of the renewal 
of military operations. This keeps the population militarily mobilized and constitutes the 
strongest obstacle to constructive, development-oriented thinking, as well as to the 
building of civil society. In most parts of Georgia, however, the issue of Abkhazia shifted 
long ago to the periphery of political discussions. In spite of state propaganda, and the 
continual attempts by the political groups representing, or claiming to represent, the 
refugees (Internally Displaced Persons - IDPs) from Abkhazia, the problems of day-to-
day survival or business interests preoccupy the general public far more than the prospect 
of war in Abkhazia. Apart from a few militants, mostly among the IDPs, the population 
would rather support a peaceful solution to the Abkhazian problem, although for the 
majority any solution that involved losing Abkhazia would be unacceptable. 
 
2. Legal status 
 
Most debates today revolve around the legal status of Abkhazia within/vis-à-vis Georgia. 
I doubt whether it is possible - or even very important - to resolve the question of 
political status in the short term. Problems other than status have to be resolved in order 
to reduce tension. But both sides’ concerns and interests in the discussion on political 
status have to be properly analysed if there is to be a productive dialogue. The Abkhaz 
are concerned with how they will maintain control and who will guarantee their security 
after they have become a minority again, which will happen if the IDPs are allowed to 
return and take part in the political process through democratic procedures. The Abkhaz, 
who have won the war and - for the first time in a century - now have a favourable 
demographic percentage, have great difficulty in facing such prospects. 
 
The Abkhaz side insists on equal (confederative) status with Georgia, which is 
unacceptable to Tbilisi. In February 1996 the Abkhaz proposed to set up a federal union 
with Georgia. According to Anri Jergenia, the Abkhaz “President's” special envoy, these 
proposals contained "elements of both a federation and a confederation". The new 
arrangement would include common national borders, joint activities in specific spheres 
and the possibility of setting up joint authorities. According to the protocol, each of the 
two equal sides would keep its constitution and relations between them would be 
regulated by a special treaty which, with the agreement of both sides, could have the 
force of constitutional law. Both sides would co-ordinate their foreign policies and 
foreign economic relations, the operation of border and customs services, power 
engineering, transport and communications, the environment and the guaranteeing of 
human and civic rights and freedoms, as well as the rights of ethnic minorities. The 
protocol implied that, by mutual agreement, Georgia and Abkhazia could increase the 
number of "co-ordinated policies".[viii] 
 
“President” Ardzinba noted that the new structure would not amount to a "classical type 
of federation". One should bear in mind that the Abkhaz side regards the above proposals 
as a compromise. According to Vladislav Ardzinba (and this is also maintained by many 
experts), the vast majority of the current population of Abkhazia would, in virtually every 
circumstance, seek closer relations with Russia than with Georgia, and Abkhazia would 
ideally prefer to join a Russian Federation than any Georgian equivalent. 
 
During his inauguration speech as Georgian President (26 November 1995), Eduard 
Shevardnadze declared: 
 
"We have always stated, and we are stating now, that time has determined that Georgia's 
state structure be shaped on a federal basis. Abkhazia will be a subject of the federation 
in Georgia with broad political status. It will have its own constitution, which will have to 
be in conformity with the constitution of a single united state. The Republic of Abkhazia 
will have its own parliament, supreme court, anthem, state emblem and other features of 
a state".[ix] 
 
 In 1997, notwithstanding the more active position adopted by the UN with regard to the 
resolution of the conflict, the Georgian-Abkhazian negotiations reached a deadlock, 
despite the fact that any further delay is detrimental to all parties. The absence of a 
clearly formulated and widely supported strategy for the resolution of ethno-territorial 
conflicts is still a problem. The general unwillingness to decentralize power in Georgia 
proper, as well as an extremely cautious attitude towards the repatriation of the 
Meskhetians (Meskhetian Turks), are causing increased suspicion among the negotiating 
partners as to the sincerity of the liberal and federalist statements made by the Georgian 
government, and have led to accusations of a double standard. 
 
Among the various options for the future status of Abkhazia that are being discussed - 
whether it should join Russia, Georgia or a Caucasian Confederation, or stay totally 
independent - for the time being there does not seem to be any alternative to finding some 
sort of compromise with the Tbilisi government, even if other options would be 
preferable to the vast majority of ethnic Abkhaz. There are unfortunately no signs that 
both sides are actually looking for specific arrangements in a constructive way (contrary 
to all their rhetoric about doing so). Russia’s attitude reduces still further the chances of 
finding this kind of solution: its post-war policy on Chechnya demonstrates that it is 
ready to deploy its still formidable resources to maintain control over the North 
Caucasus, and it still seems to believe that a compromise that is mutually acceptable to 
the Georgians and the Abkhaz would not be beneficial for Russian control over the 
region. Russia is, however, unlikely to decide to incorporate Abkhazia formally, while it 
may be ready to assist it in maintaining its de facto independence for quite a long time. 
 
For the Abkhaz, the issue of status used to be a pretext for blocking negotiations and 
thereby preventing the return of the IDPs/refugees, which could have endangered the 
demographic balance that emerged after the war. For the Georgians, the negotiation 
process was only a means of demonstrating their good intentions and readiness to solve 
the conflict on internationally favoured terms, while there was no real will to seek a 
compromise. Despite their rhetoric, neither side really wanted to get to the heart of the 
matter and solve the problem of legal status, preferring - if no explicit gain was possible 
immediately - to wait until better bargaining positions were secured. 
 
The only alternatives to a compromise between Tbilisi and Sukhumi are either military 
action, which would be detrimental to all and seems to be less probable, except perhaps 
on a limited scale (e.g. in Gali or the Kodori valley), or a further stalling of the 
negotiations - "neither peace nor war". This last scenario seemed to be the one preferred 
by all parties for several years, but it has now ceased to be so, in so far as both 
governments are beginning to lose control over the situation - a clear trend in 1997. 
 
Moreover, the deadlock in the negotiations is becoming more and more damaging to both 
parties. Finally, it could be argued that the opinion quoted in the document presented at 
the beginning of this chapter - that the final determination of the legal status should not 
be a precondition for any other progress in the peace process - makes a good deal of 
sense. Postponing such a solution until a time when the sides have a better basis for 
mutual understanding, designing provisional status on the basis of functional needs and 
approaches, and proceeding in the meantime with other important issues, is a viewpoint I 
would fully support. 
 
3. Georgian refugees/IDPs and the Gali region 
 
The Abkhaz side uses two main arguments to counter the Georgian demand for the 
refugees to return soon to Abkhazia. According to the Sochi protocols of April 1994,[x] 
any Georgians who took part in military action should be prohibited from returning - 
economic difficulties and the risk of spontaneous violence are used as a second argument 
against their return. Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first is incompatible 
with any respected legal tradition: of course, war criminals should be prosecuted 
notwithstanding their ethnic origin, but to instigate proceedings against all those who 
have carried weapons is a very different matter. It is not only unfair, as people should not 
be prosecuted for taking one side or another in a civil war, it is also technically 
impossible to have independent legal bodies check the behaviour of the entire Georgian 
population during the war. The argument that the economic situation is unfavourable is 
not a very strong one either: technical and financial terms can be agreed by both parties in 
order to make the return of the IDPs possible. Neither of the two arguments can be 
invoked in relation to the return of refugees to the Gali region, which has a homogeneous 
Georgian population and where the return of IDPs is already an irreversible process. 
According to various estimates, the number of Georgians in Gali is about as high as the 
number of Abkhaz in Abkhazia (the latter number continues to decrease, creating a 
further imbalance). 
 
Although the Gali region has been owned alternately over the centuries by Megrelian/ 
Georgian and Abkhazian feudal lords, it has had almost no Abkhazian population in the 
20th century. Whatever arguments the Abkhaz use regarding the Georgian presence in 
their homeland, there is no historical or other legitimization for discriminatory policies 
towards the Georgian population in this region. Nor would such policies receive any 
support from Abkhazia’s North Caucasian allies. Abkhaz officials will therefore have 
great difficulty in coping with any eruptions of violence in Gali. 
 
The possibility of returning the Gali region to Georgian control, in exchange for peace 
and an acceptable political status, was discussed among the Abkhaz leadership. The 
opportunity for such an exchange has been lost, however, as the Georgian government no 
longer has to negotiate the future of Gali on the same terms as before - it just needs to 
wait for a more opportune moment. An attempt to create a separate Megrel nationality 
(out of a linguistically distinct Georgian sub-ethnic group) as a strategic alternative, 
which is proposed and strongly supported by a British scholar, George Hewitt, and is 
being implemented in practice by the Abkhaz leadership, has come too late, as the 
majority of the IDPs (predominantly Megrelians) have strengthened their Georgian 
identity after their exodus from Abkhazia. 
  
Specific measures concerning the Georgian IDPs and people who went missing during 
the war could promote dialogue between Georgians and Abkhaz. A moratorium on 
changing the property rights of the IDPs and refugees from Abkhazia - which would in 
fact mean unilaterally depriving them of their property left behind in Abkhazia, until the 
achievement of a final solution or a special agreement - could be reciprocated on the 
Georgian side by long-term commitments regarding the economic development of 
Abkhazia. The mutual exchange of data concerning the persons reported missing during 
the war, as well as further collaboration in searching for them, is another area that is 
important for confidence-building. 
 
4. Demographic balance 
 
Demographic relations that may benefit one side or the other is a major concern of both 
parties, but especially the Abkhaz. No progress achieved on the question of political 
status would be of much value to the Abkhaz if the pre-war demographic balance were 
restored. Hence most discussions on political issues, even if they are not explicitly linked 
to demography, have a demographic dimension that should not be underestimated in 
efforts to understand the motives of both parties. 
 
The demographic position of the Abkhaz community has been progressively weakened, 
since the 1860s, through an immigration flow of Georgians (mainly of the Megrelian sub-
ethnos), Russians and Armenians. Abkhazians felt particularly threatened by the massive 
immigration of Georgians that started in the 1930s, leading the proportion of Abkhazians 
in the total population to decline to 17 or 18 % per cent by the 1980s, when their number 
was about the same as that of both the Russian and Armenian communities in Abkhazia, 
and less than half that of the Georgians (approximately 46%). 
 
The importance of this issue needs to be recognized in the negotiation process if real 
progress is to be achieved. The Abkhaz had hoped to win time after the war by slowing 
down the negotiations and postponing a final solution, in order to establish their position 
on the international scene and change the demographic balance in their favour by a 
massive repatriation of the diaspora Abkhaz. Their hope that these objectives would be 
achieved, thereby strengthening their negotiating position, has waned since then. 
 
According to E. Wesselink, the repatriation of Abkhazians from abroad should not be 
expected in the near future: 
 
"The repatriation movement never gained momentum. The number of returnees are 
counted in hundreds rather than in thousands. A number of delegations visited the North 
Caucasus around 1990 to study the prospects for repatriation programmes. The visitors 
were disappointed at the low standard of living in the North Caucasus. Another problem 
was the fact that the Abkhaz in Abkhazia appeared to be Christians and that the other 
North West Caucasians showed no real interest in religious teachings."[xi] 
or is there any sign of international recognition for the Abkhazian State, and even leading 
Chechen politicians have withdrawn their support from the Abkhazian case.[xii] But even 
more important is the fact that the permanent threat and dire economic prospects are 
worsening rather than improving the ethno-demographic balance of the Abkhaz. They are 
emigrating, thereby voting with their feet against current policies. Already there seem to 
be more Georgians and Armenians than Abkhaz in Abkhazia, and this trend may not 
change if the approach based on playing for time continues. 
 
 While the importance of the ethno-demographic issue is at present an obstacle to 
reconciliation, it seems likely that it may eventually turn into a powerful stimulus in the 
search of compromise. One can imagine Georgians accepting or even encouraging the 
repatriation of diaspora Abkhaz in exchange for the gradual return of refugees, and thus a 
certain demographic balance could be negotiated and secured. Even if a significant 
repatriation process would require political stability and economic revival, the process of 
repatriation could start on more than a symbolic scale. But only compromises between 
Abkhaz and Georgians can promote such a process, and Tbilisi should be aware of this 
asset in the negotiations. At present, however, the Georgian political establishment is 
strongly opposed to the idea of Abkhazian repatriation. 
 
5. The Abkhazian language and cultural security 
 
Cultural insecurity, or a national community’s fear of losing its ethnic and cultural 
identity, is a vitally important factor in the Abkhaz attitude towards reconciliation 
prospects. The Abkhaz traditionally tend to lean more than the Georgians towards the 
Russian culture and language, and at the same time they stress their ethnic proximity to 
the North Caucasian groups of Adyghs and Circassians. These cultural attitudes conflict 
with those of the Georgians, who have a strong pro-Western bent. Such a cultural clash 
between the Abkhazians and Georgians was potentially exacerbated by the displacement 
of the strongly Russified Georgian (mostly Megrelian) population of Abkhazia to the 
more explicitly Georgian cultural environment. 
 
The majority of Abkhazians, in particular the Christian population in the southern part of 
the region, are culturally very close to the neighbouring Megrelians, to the extent that 
until recently there were no clear borderlines of ethnic self-identification. Some members 
of a family might, for instance, consider themselves as being Georgian, while others in 
the same family regard themselves as Abkhaz. Pragmatic considerations play a role here. 
Georgians and Abkhaz share many family names. Paradoxically, some very patriotic 
people on both sides have the same family name. These facts generate additional mutual 
suspicion and lead to accusations of assimilatory policies. 
 
Georgians, formerly the largest ethnic group in Abkhazia, generally accept the 
Abkhazians’ right to have their language recognized as a state language. Unlike in the 
past (in Gamsakhurdia's time particularly, this was not always the dominant opinion), 
now they also acknowledge that the Abkhazians are an "autochthonous" population, a 
status they do not ascribe to other ethnic groups in Abkhazia, such as Russians or 
Armenians. At the same time, Georgians believe that they themselves have the same right 
to be considered an autochthonous population there, a claim that is based on various 
historical arguments, such as the dominance of Georgian inscriptions on Abkhazian 
monasteries and other historic monuments. The Abkhaz are unwilling to accept such 
arguments, fearing that the re-establishment of the Georgian majority and culture in 
Abkhazia, without strong guarantees, could endanger the very survival of their own 
culture and the fate of the nation itself. The Abkhaz perceive the Russian cultural milieu 
as less dangerous for their own cultural survival, owing to the diversity and size of the 
Russian cultural arena.  Many joint initiatives could be taken in the cultural field shared 
by Georgians and Abkhaz, to begin with, for instance, the recreation of the historic 
Abkhaz archives burnt in Sukhumi during the war, by providing copies of relevant 
documents and other materials; the restoration of libraries; co-operation in the field of 
education, for example in preparing text-books in the Abkhazian language, etc. Great 
caution, however, would be needed here on the Georgian side, due to the ever-present 
suspicion of Georgian cultural expansionism. 
 
6. Armenians in Abkhazia 
 
The Armenian population, which already dominated some districts before the war, is at 
present considered by some experts to constitute the largest community in Abkhazia. 
They are, however, strongly under-represented on government bodies. In the past, they 
generally expressed their solidarity with the Abkhazians in their struggle for secession. 
Some Armenians from Armenia and Karabakh took part in military action on the 
Abkhazian side, while the majority of the few Armenians fighting on the Georgian side 
during the war came from other regions of Georgia. While the Armenian government in 
Yerevan explicitly states its neutrality in the conflict, favouring the search for a peaceful 
solution, and declares its support for Georgia's territorial integrity, there used to be great 
sympathy for the Abkhaz case among the Armenian population and nationalist political 
circles in Armenia proper. According to Michael Ochs,[xiii] Levon Ter-Petrossyan was 
considered, after the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, as a democrat, a 
legitimate president, and more generally "a rational guy with whom you can talk and with 
whom you can compromise, not a nationalist". Tbilisi was unhappy about Ter-
Petrossyan's weakened position, and worried about political instability in Armenia. 
 
 In June 1997, during an official visit by the Armenian president to Georgia, Ter-
Petrossyan and Shevardnadze went together to Akhalkalaki, where the Armenian 
president declared that the last thing Armenia needed was to have problems with Georgia 
regarding Akhalkalaki, which has a large Armenian minority.[xiv] This concern is not 
shared by the Dashnaks (an opposition nationalist party in Armenia), who have territorial 
claims against Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. From the Georgian perspective, a 
weakening of Ter-Petrossyan's position in Armenia would reduce his leverage on the 
militant, nationalist Armenian groupings. 
 
7. Relations with North Caucasians/Adyghs 
 
The Abkhaz strive for closer relations with the North Caucasians, and particularly the 
Adyghs (including the Circassians and Kabardinians), who belong to the same linguistic 
group as the Abkhaz, unlike most of the other North Caucasian ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, since the co-ordinated resistance to Russian conquest during the Great 
Caucasian War of the 19th century - in which the battle between the Russians and 
Abkhazians constituted the final episode - Abkhazians have developed a strong sense of a 
common fate and identity with the Northern Caucasus, further strengthened by their co-
operative relationship with the descendants of Mohajirs (belonging to different North-
Caucasian ethnic groups) in the Near East and Turkey, and also by their later attempts to 
join this fragile North Caucasian unity after the February Revolution of 1917. During 
perestroika, there was a new attempt at such a union with the creation of the 
Confederation of the Mountainous Peoples of the Caucasus. This Confederation’s first 
conference took place in August 1989 in Sukhumi, regarded as the future capital of the 
new union. The various nationalities represented in the Confederation have no fear of 
being dominated by any one group - a confidence which feels very different from what 
they experienced throughout their history with Russia or Georgia. This explains the 
attractiveness of the idea of creating a multiethnic union of Caucasians, even if such a 
union could be considered romantic and will certainly not be easy to achieve. The 
Abkhaz scholar Gueorgui Otyrba has formulated this perception as follows:[xv] 
 
 "The history and the destiny of Abkhazia are closely connected with those of all the 
peoples of the North Caucasus. Today they share a common history of suffering and 
oppression, of deportations and cultural destruction, and of fighting powerful enemies. 
They also share a determination to protect themselves against a repetition of history. 
They have seized the opportunity created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and 
by Russia's and Georgia's relative weakness, to assert their rights and bring about a 
situation that can provide better guarantees for their survival in the future." 
  
The Abkhaz will therefore strive - even if this is not at the moment explicitly expressed 
during the negotiations - for the creation of open borders to the North Caucasus, and in 
particular for unhindered cultural and economic exchange with the Adyghs. For the 
Georgians, transparent borders are still a sensitive issue, however, as are its borders with 
North Ossetia, Chechnya and Daghestan. In all these cases the Georgian government has 
to cope with the consequences of having national minorities of the same ethnic group 
inhabiting both sides of a state border. 
 
In conceiving the future of the Caucasus, Georgians stress their central - both 
advantageous and dangerous - position in the region and would like to secure a central 
role in regional politics. Georgia’s relations with most of its northern neighbours have 
improved significantly since the end of the Chechen war, culminating in the official visit 
by the Chechen president, Maskhadov, to Georgia in autumn 1997. The Georgian 
leadership hopes that the Western Caucasian mountain peoples will follow the example 
of the Chechens, who have earned considerable respect in the region, and thus ensure 
more neutrality in the event of renewed conflict. 
 
8. The Russian presence and Russian border 
 
The Russians control their border with Abkhazia, its coastal zone and have military bases 
there. Russia is also the exclusive provider of peace-keeping forces, acting formally 
under the aegis of the CIS. It exercises significant control over the external and internal 
policies of the Sukhumi government. The economic blockade imposed by Russia under 
Georgian political pressure conforms to the traditional pattern of Russian politics: its aim 
is to weaken all the parties in conflict so that it can effectively continue to play the role of 
arbiter in the dispute. 
 
Russia's policies in Abkhazia, as elsewhere in the Caucasus and in the "Near Abroad" 
regions, are in keeping with a "post-imperialist" value system, as described by Pavel 
Baev:[xvi] 
 
"The most distinctive feature of Russia's policies towards the other fourteen states which 
emerged from the rubble of the USSR is inconsistency often bordering on 
incomprehensibility. (...) What makes the political complexities even more striking is the 
quite broad consensus among Russia's political élites on the main policy goals in the so-
called 'Near Abroad'. This consensus had already emerged by late 1993 and survived all 
the turbulent election campaigns. (...) To my mind, if a definition of Russian policy is 
needed or indeed possible, it is rather 'post-imperialist'; this notion refers to a declining 
power which tries to compensate for inevitable retreats by some new engagements, feels 
the need to protect compatriots left 'out there' but desperately lacks the resources to do so, 
and attempts to prevent spill-over from various violent conflicts while being itself a 
major source of instability." 
 
From the Abkhazian perspective, the Russian presence, notwithstanding all its 
vacillations, constitutes the only guarantee against a catastrophic renewal of the military 
operation, and against the risk of losing the gains from their previous victory. This 
enables the Russians to manipulate Abkhazian concerns to their own advantage, but the 
Abkhaz cannot fully rely on Russian support, which may be withdrawn as soon as the 
stakes change. The Georgians, while blaming the Russian presence for prolonging the 
stalemate in the conflict, nevertheless expect that the Russians will sooner or later take 
their side. 
 
9. Economic development 
 
There is a low level of market economy in Abkhazia, with most food grown for domestic 
consumption. Many inhabitants possess some land which is enough for their subsistence. 
Those who are employed in the public sector and who have not been paid for months 
have been given plots of land instead of wages by the government. There is some small 
trade, for instance between Gali and Sukhumi. Due to the CIS blockade, the import of 
goods - some Turkish ships travel to Sukhumi - barely meets the population’s needs. 
 
Major export items are tangerines and other citrus fruit. The export of the surplus 
production of between 60,000 and 100,000 tons of citrus fruit to Russia is extremely 
difficult because of the semi-closure, by Russian officials, of the railway and road linking 
Abkhazia with Russia, while domestic industry lacks the capacity to process the crop into 
juice or concentrate. Other exports are nuts and scrap metal. The road system is very bad 
and there are few cars, though there is some public transport in the bigger towns. There is 
also some traffic between Gali and Zugdidi (on the Georgian side) - this has to be 
registered with the Gali authorities, where tax must be paid; there are also several 
unofficial (easier and cheaper) crossing points on the Georgian/Abkhaz border. Electric 
energy is more regular in Abkhazia than in most parts of Georgia, thanks to the power 
supply from the Inguri dam and from Russia. Widespread economic hardship, however, 
is driving more and more emigrants out of the region. 
  
In the meantime, the Georgian economy is reviving and is even arousing increasing 
interest among potential investors, even though the current situation should not be seen 
through rosy-tinted glasses. Co-operation on the economic rehabilitation and 
development of Abkhazia could, in the event of a lasting consensus between the two 
opposing sides, succeed in attracting significant international resources, as is currently 
happening in Tskhinvali. This could prove to be the best means for combining the 
interests of both sides and fostering mutual understanding. 
 
The areas of technical co-operation that serve the interests of both sides can easily be 
defined as soon as a framework for such discussion is created with the assistance of the 
UN and OSCE missions, and these may represent the best arena for the most important 
and difficult endeavour - building confidence between the former adversaries. 
 
10. Physical security of citizens and the possibility of a new wave of violence 
 
Despite the current negotiations, the possibility of new outbursts of violence remains. The 
Georgian and Abkhaz governments, as well as the mediators, now have to define what 
their reaction would be in such a situation. Although there is much discussion of the 
possibility of a new war, no preventive action is being taken. It is far from clear how 
atrocities and violent actions against the civilian population would be prevented. A 
discussion needs to be started on how to design mechanisms for humanitarian 
intervention and on the types of intervention that would be helpful in de-escalating the 
conflict, in order to reduce casualties and other negative consequences for the peace 
process. 
 
IV - Prospects 
 
The strong interdependence of the conflicts in the region is another very important factor 
to be taken into account when designing peace initiatives for Abkhazia. A future 
settlement may change the balance of forces in the Caucasus region. Hence a holistic 
approach to the region’s problems, one which takes into account its specific cultural and 
political features, is critical for drafting effective regional policies. 
 
It is interesting to notice that while the governments often refer to the Israeli-Palestinian 
experience, the NGO community and those involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian dialogue 
pay relatively little attention to the fruitful ideas that have been put forward in the Middle 
East conflict. This concerns not only the infamous "land for peace" principle, applied by 
Israel in its relations with its Arab neighbours after the military victories over the latter 
and its occupation of part of their territories, but also other initiatives, such as the Oslo 
Declaration, signed initially by the - officially non-engaged - Palestinian and Jewish 
partisans of a peaceful resolution of the conflict, which proposes certain steps for 
achieving this. Private initiatives may start attracting public opinion to positive ideas, for 
instance the collection of signatures in support of peace (with a third/Western party doing 
the collecting). Other lessons to be learnt include the vital importance of a proper 
(especially temporal) co-ordination of initiatives.[xvii] 
 
By the second half of 1997, the Sukhumi and Tbilisi governments seemed to be more 
open to real compro-mises. The obstacles are, however, great. One of the factors is 
external: Moscow’s unwillingness to lose this very effective lever of control over 
Georgian policies, and its paradoxical desire to maintain such control notwith-standing 
great economic losses due to the blockade of transport and communications travelling 
from Russia to Turkey and passing through Abkhazian territory, as well as the other 
benefits of having a peaceful, prosperous neighbour in the south. 
 
Even more important is the unwillingness of the Abkhazians to risk a restoration of the 
status quo ante bellum, i.e., to return to a situation in which they would be a minority, 
unable to preserve the monopoly of power in a democratic scenario of development, 
regardless of the legal status they would acquire within the framework of Georgia. One of 
the scenarios being discussed at present is a territorial division of Abkhazia into a number 
of districts, in each of which either the Abkhazians or the Georgians would establish their 
political control. The Abkhazian government could not make such a decision, based on 
the "peace for territory" principle, without strong popular support. Detailed scenarios for 
such a process are lacking. The parties have defined no priorities or negotiable elements 
that could constitute a basis for a mutually acceptable compromise, and no creative 
approaches are being adopted in the search for such a compromise. This is partly due to 
the governments’ lack of political will to achieve real results, and also partly to particular 
group interests linked to the suspended situation of "no war - no peace". Both 
govern-ments are hostages to their own declarations and promises. Great courage and 
political inspiration are needed to break down stereotypes and secure popular support for 
innovative approaches. It is vitally necessary to develop a series of detailed scenarios that 
would be acceptable to each side, and then work on the gradual convergence of at least 
some of them - this may lead to the realization that the differences in viewpoint between 
the former adversaries are not as great as they previously appeared to be. The majority of 
these differences are, contrary to popular belief, not mutually exclusive - rather, they are 
symbolic or terminological in nature, and could be overcome if due effort were made. 
 
As the two conflicting parties have different priorities - for instance concerning their 
legal status or the return of refugees - it is quite difficult to solve individual problems 
when they are negotiated as part of a whole package. Hence, one of the ways of 
proceeding with resolving the conflict is to try to narrow the focus temporarily, breaking 
down the problem into a list of individual issues which are closely linked to one another, 
certainly, but which may nevertheless be handled and discussed separately. Only after 
considering these issues and coming to some agreements, or at least reaching an 
understanding of one another’s viewpoints, will it be possible to discuss the whole 
package again, in an integrated form. 
 
Time is working against the interests of the Abkhazians, but this does not mean that 
either the Georgians or Russians would benefit from a further postponement of a peace 
settlement. Russia has actually lost - and is continuing to lose - a great deal, having been 
cut off from her southern transportation routes, alienated Georgia and forfeited important 
levers of influence in the region. But Georgia too is a loser in this zero-sum game. Apart 
from the human suffering caused by a prolonged conflict, fewer and fewer Georgians 
may be inclined to return to Abkhazia, while the uncertain future of the IDPs is posing 
enormous problems for the weak Georgian State. At the same time, Georgia is losing the 
considerable economic benefits it would enjoy with an integrated economy and a north-
south transportation route. 
 
One potential area for economic co-operation may be the prospect of transforming the 
Gali district into a free economic zone which would be put provisionally under an 
international security regime.[xviii] This would create a safe buffer area, preventing open 
military action, but it could also serve as a pilot initiative for further balanced economic 
co-operation. Gali is important in this respect not only because of its border location or 
because of its Georgian population, but also thanks to its high economic - particularly 
agricultural - potential. It is worth noting that, even in the current strained situation, Gali 
is to a certain extent already performing the role of a clearing-house and exchange market 
for the two sides. 
 
I am, of course, fully aware that no concrete settlement can be reached by individuals 
from the two communities that are not representing their respective governments, but 
their proposals can contribute to a spirit of compromise, which is essential to the 
negotiation process. If we are able to find common ground in at least some areas, this 
could serve as a starting point for broader discussions. I am quite sure that almost all of 
the contradictions discussed are resolvable, if innovative thinking is applied, and if we try 
to look at the problems through the eyes of other side as well. The existing problems have 
to be correlated to the real, basic needs and interests of both peoples, as distinct from 
populist slogans and wrongly perceived interests that only lead to further confrontation. It 
does seem that if the intellectuals of both sides, supported by international experts and 
mediators, were able to formulate at least a few concrete ideas in the form of a set of 
declarations, this could be instrumental in establishing a co-operative approach to conflict 
resolution, and would help all the sides involved to see the conflict and its consequences 
through other eyes, instead of just their own. 
 
A helpful instrument in proceeding further with the peace and negotiation processes 
could be the creation of a mixed discussion forum constituted by respected individuals 
from both sides. These would receive a mandate from their respective leaderships to 
discuss the possible terms of the conflict settlement, and would regularly inform their 
leaderships about progress, but would not have the authority to sign any documents or 
make decisions. Such a forum, moderated by international experts and assisted by the 
authority of organizations such as the UN or OSCE, could perform several important 
functions: generating and testing new ideas in a non-restrictive environment; maintaining 
a two-way exchange of information between the governments; working as an informal 
negotiating body, and as a public advocate of a peaceful solution. 
  
V - CONCLUSIONS 
 
While it is important to speculate about how and when the solution to the Abkhazian 
conflict will be found, it may be of more immediate value to pose the question of where 
alternative ideas and influences that could shape the future solution will come from. In 
broad terms, one can identify three such sources: first, political and social currents within 
Abkhazia/Georgia, second, Russia, including the peoples of the Northern Caucasus, and 
third, international institutions. 
 
Both sides have been labouring under the illusion that time is on their side. Both 
are now losing, however, as a result of the deadlock in the conflict, and experiencing 
major economic, demographic and political losses. There can be no winners in the game 
they are currently playing. In the first few years after the war, the Abkhaz could hope that 
time would bring international recognition and the repatriation of the Abkhaz from the 
diaspora, but this seems less probable now. Even the support of the North Caucasians, 
which played an important role during the war, is not assured at present, especially that of 
the Vainakh peoples. In its turn, if the Georgian government too hoped to use time to 
strengthen its military forces decisively, secure Russian support for its case and see the 
impoverishment and weakening of the Sukhumi government, they must be disappointed, 
as there are no signs of such trends. Indeed, in the immediate post-war period the conflict 
helped Georgia to distance itself from Russian dominance, and develop an independent 
approach in its state-building. Today, when Russian strength is waning, and the Georgian 
State has already begun to overcome most of the difficulties besetting it at the start of 
independence, priorities need to be changed. 
 
The present situation cannot continue indefinitely. Pressures on the conflicting 
parties, both from without and from within, are mounting, while the leaderships (who 
until recently demonstrated a manifest lack of will to resolve the conflict) now seem to be 
becoming more flexible and open to compromise. There are several possible alternative 
solutions - the people of Abkhazia and Georgia will decide which of them shall prevail. 
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